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Special Contribution

Appellate Conflicts in Local
Government Law: The
Disagreements of a Decade

by R. Perry Sentell, Jr.*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In awesome solemnity, Chief Justice John Marshall thundered in
1803, "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is."1 Marshall's historic declaration has
borne both lavish praise and unstinting criticism, 2 and it serves as the
*

Carter Professor of Law Emeritus, The University of Georgia. University of Georgia

(A.B., 1956; LL.B., 1958); Harvard University (LL.M., 1961). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
2. Commonly cited sources are William W. Van Alstyne, A CriticalGuide to Marbury
v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 30; ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (Gilbert A. Harrison ed., 1962). See also
Marbury v. Madison: A Bicentennial Symposium, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105-1573 (2003).
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commonly understood sentiment underlying the legal order of our
country. At both federal and state levels, the "judicial department" rules
our daily lives by virtue of saying "what the law is."
At the state level, constitutions and statutes typically establish a
judicial branch of government and populate that branch with all manner
of courts-local, trial, and appellate. Those courts apply and interpret
statutory strictures and common law principles, ultimately resolving the
rights and obligations of both government and individual.
The Georgia Constitution fashions a bi-level appellate system,
composed of an intermediate appellate court, the Georgia Court of
Appeals,' and at the apex, the Georgia Supreme Court.4 Each court is
styled "a court of review,"' each possesses a described jurisdiction,6 and
via various procedures, the supreme court reviews at least some of the
Additionally, "[tihe decisions of the
court of appeals decisions. 7
[Georgia] Supreme Court bind all other courts as precedents."' Because
they are final, the supreme court's dispositions provide the (legally)
"correct" solutions to the issues litigated.
Inevitably, the supreme court occasionally encounters a decision by the
court of appeals with which it differs. In that event the supreme court
must "correct" the perceived "error," thereby reversing the court of
appeals resolution of the case. These reversals occur across the
illimitable substantive spectrum of Georgia law, extending randomly
throughout the pages of the Georgia Reports. An effort merely to
designate and catalogue their total instances would summon a persistence of herculean proportions.
Perhaps, however, a severely restricted focus upon a single subject
area, extending over a relatively brief period, would serve a useful
purpose. Such an exercise might yield results of general interest on the

3. See GA. CONST. art. VI, § 5, para. 1 (1983): "The Court of Appeals shall consist of
not less than nine Judges who shall elect from among themselves a Chief Judge."
4. See GA. CONST. art. VI, § 6, para. 1 (1983): "The Supreme Court shall consist of not
more than nine Justices who shall elect from among themselves a Chief Justice...."
5. See GA. CONST. art. VI, § 5, para. 1: "The Court of Appeals shall be a court of review
and shall exercise appellate and certiorari jurisdiction in all cases not reserved to the
Supreme Court or conferred on other courts by law. .. ." GA. CONST. art. VI, § 6, para. 2:
"The Supreme Court shall be a court of review and shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction in the following cases .....
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., GA. CoNST. art. VI, § 6, para. 5: "The Supreme Court may review by
certiorari cases in the Court of Appeals which are of gravity or great public importance."
For treatment of the supreme court's practices in exercising its certiorari jurisdiction, see
R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Lightening the Load: In the Georgia Supreme Court, 37 GA. L. REV.
697 (2003).
8. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 6, para. 6.
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phenomena of appellate reversals and more explicit edification on the
selected subject.
On the subject of local government law, articles annually surveying
the field will provide a perspective for ponder and a means of measurement.9 A canvas of the last ten survey articles will identify the cases
in which the supreme court reversed the court of appeals, as well as the
specific legal issues drawing the appellate conflicts. 10 The effort will
reflect, for the law of local government, the appellate disagreements of
a decade.

II.

A DECADE OF REVERSALS: NUMERICAL FACETS

Attention initially devolves to facets amenable to absolute numerical
calculation. Pivotal, of course, are the total instances of reversals and
the years in which they occurred. Those revelations operate to unfold an
entire decade of local government law's appellate divisiveness.
Additionally, an identification of the subject cases themselves will
disclose whether the supreme court was unanimous in its decision of
reversal and whether its action ultimately favored the local government.
Finally, some focus on "causation" might prove insightful, i.e., whether
the court of appeals original decision reversed or affirmed the trial court
in the case, and consequently, the eventual impact upon the trial's result
occasioned by the supreme court's subsequent reversal. These numerical
facets can be elaborated in a fairly brief order.

A.

Total Reversals

The following table chronicles the total occasions upon which the
Georgia Supreme Court reversed (over the past ten survey years)

9. These articles appear annually in each fall issue of the Mercer Law Review.
Although they are simply "survey" efforts, designed primarily to keep the practitioner
current on local government legal developments, the articles are fairly complete in
coverage, and in identifying the cases in which the supreme court is reviewing decisions
by the court of appeals. Although possibly lacking in total accuracy, they come close.
10. The canvassed articles are: R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Law, 55
MERCER L. REV. 353-96 (2003); 54 MERCER L. REV. 417-60 (2002); 53 MERCER L. REV. 389440 (2001); 52 MERCER L. REV. 341-81 (2000); 51 MERCER L. REV. 397-439 (1999); 50
MERCER L. REV. 263-305 (1998); 49 MERCER L. REV. 215-55 (1997); 48 MERCER L. REV. 42154 (1996); 47 MERCER L. REV. 225-68 (1995); 46 MERCER L. REV. 363-99 (1994). This effort
thus derives from discussions consuming a total of 423 pages.
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decisions by the Georgia Court of Appeals dealing with issues of local
government law."

TABLE I
Number of Cases in Which Supreme Court
Reversed Court of Appeals 1994-2003
Survey Year
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

Cases
1
3
1
3
0

Survey Year
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Total

Cases
2
4
2
0
2
18 Cases

Whatever notoriety reversals may attract within the local government
bar, their occurrence in the recent past has proceeded at a relatively
steady judicial pace. As Table I reveals, the Georgia Supreme Court
reversed the Georgia Court of Appeals in a total of eighteen local
government cases during the last ten survey years. That combination of
time and total yields a decade reversal average of 1.8 cases per
decisional year. As further reflected, the total reversals ranged from a
high of four cases in the survey year 2000 to a low of no cases in survey
years 1998 and 2002. As they are distributed over the ten-survey-year
period, the reversals reflect no particularly significant trend in frequency
of occurrence, and only a slight increase over the course of the decade.
(The first five years of the surveyed period produced a total of eight
reversals as compared with ten disagreements during the final five
Finally, as with many statistical findings, evaluation is
years.)
controlled by perspective. On one hand, given local government law's
pervasive reach, a reversal rate averaging less than two cases per year
might be viewed as fairly minimal appellate correctional scrutiny.
Contrarily, in such a unique practice, an average reversal rate of almost
two cases per decisional year might be considered fairly substantial
appellate oversight.

11. Because the annual survey period for the articles runs from June through May, it
overlaps the calendar years in which the cases were actually decided. Beyond taking note
of that fact, however, the discussion here is based on the decade of survey period cases.
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For the sake of completeness, Table II transfers the ten survey years
into the eleven calendar years in which the cases were actually decided.
Table II
Calendar Years in Which Supreme Court
Reversed Court of Appeals 1993-2003
CalendarYear
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

Cases
1
2
2
2
1

Calendar Year
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Total

Cases
1
5
1
1
0
2
18 Cases

The effect of this translation of survey years into calendar years is to
add an additional year (1993) to the total, and with one exception, to
spread the cases more evenly throughout the period. The year containing the largest number of reversals moves from 2000 back to 1999. With
number and time of reversals tabulated, a focus upon the individual
cases of appellate disagreement appears appropriate at this juncture.
B.

The Cases and the Nature of the Reversals
The following table reflects the style of each of the eighteen cases
reversed and the calendar year of each decision. 2 Additionally, the

12. The cases and their references are as follows: City of Winder v. McDougald, 276
Ga. 866, 583 S.E.2d 879 (2003); City of Decatur v. DeKalb County, 277 Ga. 292, 589 S.E.2d
561 (2003); Dudley v. State, 273 Ga. 466, 542 S.E.2d 99 (2001); Jackson v. Shadix, 272 Ga.
631, 533 S.E.2d 706 (2000); City of Tybee Island v. Godinho, 270 Ga. 567, 511 S.E.2d 517
(1999), overruled on other grounds by Atlanta Comm. for the Olympic Games, Inc. v.
Hawthorne, 278 Ga. 116, 118, 598 S.E.2d 471, 474 (2004); City of Marietta v. Edwards, 271
Ga. 349, 519 S.E.2d 217 (1999); City of Douglasville v. Queen, 270 Ga. 770, 514 S.E.2d 195
(1999); Rowe v. Coffey, 270 Ga. 715, 515 S.E.2d 375 (1999); Adams v. Hazelwood, 271 Ga.
414, 520 S.E.2d 896 (1999); Seay v. Cleveland, 270 Ga. 64, 508 S.E.2d 159 (1998); Roberts
v. Burke County Sch. Dist., 267 Ga. 665, 482 S.E.2d 283 (1997); Hibbs v. City of Riverdale,
267 Ga. 337, 478 S.E.2d 121 (1996); City of Atlanta v. Watson, 267 Ga. 185,475 S.E.2d 896
(1996); Athens-Clarke County v. Walton Elec. Membership Corp., 265 Ga. 229, 454 S.E.2d
510 (1995); City of Winder v. Girone, 265 Ga. 723, 462 S.E.2d 704 (1995); Mixon v. City of
Warner Robins, 264 Ga. 385,444 S.E.2d 761 (1994), supersededby statute, as stated in City
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table indicates whether the supreme court's decision of reversal was
unanimous 3 and whether the reversal ultimately favored the local
government. 14

Table III
Cases & The Nature of The Reversals

Case
DeKalb County v. J&A Pipeline Co. (1993)
Mixon v. City of Warner Robbins (1994)
Gilbert v. Richardson (1994)
Athens-Clarke County v. Walton Elec. Corp.
(1995)
City of Winder v. Girone (1995)
Hibbs v. City of Riverdale (1996)
City of Atlanta v. Watson (1996)
Roberts v. Burke County School Dist. (1997)
Seay v. Cleveland (1998)
City of Tybee Island v. Godinho (1999)
City of Marietta v. Edwards (1999)
City of Douglasville v. Queen (1999)
Rowe v. Coffey (1999)
Adams v. Hazelwood (1999)
Jackson v. Shadix (2000)
Dudley v. State (2001)
City of Winder v. McDougald (2003)
City of Decatur v. DeKalb County (2003)
Totals

18 Cases

Unanimous

For Local

Court

Government

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes 13 (72%)
No 5 (28%)

Yes 15 (83%)
No 3 (17%)

of Winder v. McDougald, 276 Ga. 866, 867, 583 S.E.2d 879, 880 (2003); Gilbert v.
Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 452 S.E.2d 476 (1994); DeKalb County v. J & A Pipeline Co., 263
Ga. 645, 437 S.E.2d 327 (1993).
13. All decisions in which there were no dissents are treated as "unanimous." There
were several cases in which various justices concurred (either in "judgment only" without
opinion, or "specially" with an opinion).
14. Some of the cases were actually brought against a local government officer or
employee, but on this table are treated as cases against the local government. The
decisions shown as favoring the local government include decisions for local government
officers or employees.
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As styled, the chronologically arranged cases in Table III indicate the
local government (including the local government officer or employee)
involved in the litigation and the opposing party.15 Dated to survey
period, only two years (1998 and 2002) contained no reversals; when
translated into calendar period, that number decreases to only one year
(2002). As for the "nature" of the supreme court's reversing decisions,
the table focuses upon two primary factors: court composition and
ultimate prevailing party.
Table III reflects that when the supreme court reverses a local
government decision by the court of appeals, the justices are usually
united in that determination. Thus, in almost three-quarters of the
reversals (72%), the justices decided in unanimity. That finding, in turn,
elicits two further impressions. First, when the court of appeals is
reversed, its position is one typically deemed erroneous by the entire
membership of the supreme court. Perhaps it is that overwhelming
concurrence among themselves that convinces the justices to take the
drastic step of reversal. Alternatively, the point may at least support a
rationalization for taking the step. Second, the fact of unanimity also
serves to expose an abiding analytical enigma: How can precisely the
same legal issues so clearly resolvable in one fashion by the court of
appeals propel every justice on the supreme court to the opposite
solution? The perpetual presence of this enigma in judicial law making
does not diminish its discordant perplexity.
Table III also reveals an intriguing aspect concerning the minority of
reversals (28%) in which the justices were not unanimous in their
decision. In not a single one of those instances did the majority of the
justices decide against the local government. Thus, in every case in
which one (or more) of the justices dissented, the supreme court reached
a conclusion favoring the local government. What might logically be
deduced from this facet is problematic, but it is clear at a minimum that
the dissenters did not dissent to prevent the opposing party from
prevailing.
Aside from the supreme court's composition on the occasions of its
reversing decisions, Table III also discloses the paucity of reversals not
resulting in a local government victory. In but three of the total
eighteen reversals, only 17% of the decisions, did the ultimate resolution
favor the opposing party in the case. Whether that disclosure suggests
a lower court's adverseness to the local government is not clear.'6 One

15. In the final case charted, City of Decatur, 277 Ga. at 292, 589 S.E.2d at 561, the
opposing party is, of course, another local government.
16. This point will receive additional discussion in treating the information derived
from Table IV, infra.
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point, however, does seem apparent: When it reverses the court of
appeals, the supreme court is typically not acting out of a concern over
the opposing party's litigational plight. Accordingly, in the event a
supreme court reversal is forthcoming in the case, the local government
can more confidently anticipate a favorable result than can the opposing
party. In the overarching practice of local government law, the opposing
party's attorney is left to ponder that probability in determining whether
to seek the supreme court's review of the case.
C.

The Court of Appeals OriginalDecisions

With the cases identified and the nature of the supreme court's
reversals examined, attention finally reverts to the decisions reversed.
Only by focusing upon the court of appeals original dispositions of the
cases can the impact of the supreme court's subsequent reversals be
adequately appraised. In attempting such an appraisal, moreover, it is
informative to look as well to the cases as they emerged from the trial
process. The trial court's actions, the court of appeals dispositions, and
the supreme court's reversals all converge to explicate the appellate
review phenomena. They also assist in assessing that phenomena's
importance to a decade of local government legal development.
Table IV
Court of Appeals Original Decisions
Subsequently Reversed by Supreme Court
Case

Ct. of Apps. Rev'd
Trial Court

Yes
J&A Pipeline Co.
Mixon
Gilbert
Athens-Clarke County
Yes
Girone
Hibbs
Yes
Watson
Yes
Roberts
Seay
Yes
Godinho
Yes
Edwards
Yes
Queen
Yes
Rowe
Yes
Adams

Ct. of Apps. Aff'd
Trial Court

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes

Local Government
Ultimately Won
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
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Jackson
Dudley
McDougald
City of Decatur

Yes

Total

Yes
Yes
Yes
10 (56%)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

8 (44%)

Table IV's revelations contribute additional intrigue to the exercise.
Thus, in 56% of the local government cases in which the supreme court
reversed the court of appeals, the court of appeals had originally
reversed the trial court. Obviously, in the remaining 44% of the
supreme court's reversals, the court of appeals had originally affirmed
the trial court's dispositions of the cases. Those conclusions are of
considerable impqrt in reviewing Georgia local government law's
developments over the past decade. They evidence that in a solid
majority of the supreme court's reversals, the trial court had yielded the
"right" result in the litigation's first instance. 7 Most of the time,
therefore, nothing was accomplished for either party by the expensive
and time consuming (hence, "inefficient") process of appeal and appellate
review. That was not true, of course, in the minority of reversals in
which both the trial court and the court of appeals had been "wrong."
Table IV also radiates another striking finding. In every instance in
which the supreme court reversed the court of appeals reversal of the
trial court, the end result yielded a victory for the local government.
Thus, in 56% of the cases evoking disagreement between the appellate
courts, the court of appeals decided against, and the supreme court for,
the local government. Additionally, the table reveals, in three of the
cases featuring the supreme court's reversal of the court of appeals
affirmation of the trial court, the end result yielded a victory for the
local government. Accordingly, a resounding 72% of the total reversals
operated to "correct" the court of appeals decisions against the local
To characterize the implied proclivities as merely
government.
"appellate tendencies" would constitute a significant understatement.
III.

A DECADE OF REVERSALS: SUBSTANTiVE FACETS

Numerical elaboration in place, local government's appellate conflicts
require as well a scrutiny of substance. The issues drawing the
appellate courts' disagreements over the past decade are instructive in

17. Once again, it is important to note that the term "right" is not employed here as
a manifestation of judgment: the supreme court's decision is treated as "right" not in the
sense that it is necessarily the sounder answer, but rather that it is the final one.

[Vol. 56
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several respects. They represent local government law's most confounding problems of the era, problems requiring disposition by Georgia's
highest judicial tribunals. The opposing solutions proffered by those
tribunals reflect not only the difficulty of the questions presented, they
also unfold the common law tradition. When the supreme court reverses
the court of appeals resolution, the case law process brings its best to
bear in resolving litigational conflicts. That the process itself is
conflicted in doing so only heightens the occasion's analytical intrigue.
Table V
Issues Presented by the Cases Reversed
No. of Cases Presenting
the Issue

General Issue

County Finance
County Liability
Municipal Liability
Condemnation
Official Entitlements
Governmental Innovations
Total

% of Total Cases

3
5
7
1
1
1

17%
28%
39%
5%
5%
5%

18

99%

Table V seeks to identify the substantive issues featured in the cases
attracting the supreme court's reversals. Grouping those issues into six
general categories, the table reflects the broadly ranging subject matter
polarizing the appellate process over the past decade. Impressively, the
disagreements in twelve of the eighteen cases (67%) touched upon facets
of local government "liability." For both municipalities and counties,
responsibility for injury allegedly inflicted upon others persisted as the
point most frequently sundering the appellate courts. Some 17% of the
reversals turned on matters of county finance, and each of the three
remaining cases (a collective 15%) featured yet another disputed issue.
This substantive spectrum of disagreements thus illustrates the
phenomena of appellate reversals and its impact upon a decade of local
government litigation. Perhaps the briefest description of the cases
themselves will helpfully conclude the exercise."'

18. The decisions reviewed, going back over a decade, depended, of course, upon the
controlling statutes and cases then in effect. Obviously, the discussion here is not intended
to indicate that the results of the cases reviewed are necessarily the present rule. The
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County Finance

County financial issues occupied a continuing presence in the crosshairs of appellate disagreement. Indeed, the decade opened and closed
with reversals of significant monetary impact upon county governments
throughout the state. A chronological canvas will highlight those
economic controversies once and presently resistant to judicial consensus.
In the 1993 case of DeKalb County v. J & A Pipeline Co.,"9 a subcontractor sought county liability for labor and materials supplied on a
county public works project when the surety on the general contractor's
payment bond proved insolvent. 20 The trial court dismissed plaintiff's
action, the court of appeals reversed, 2' and the supreme court granted
certiorari.22 The court's unanimous opinion initially sketched two
relevant statutory duties: first, the general contractor's duty to supply
23
the county with a payment bond of "good and sufficient surety;"
second, the county's duty to take the bond in the required "manner and
form."24 The latter duty, the court held, did not require the county to
look beyond a duly submitted bond and surety affidavit and further
investigate the surety.25 Analogizing to lien-law requirements in the
private sphere,26 the court concluded the county was free from liability

emphasis rather is on the disagreements between the two appellate courts and the issues
of local government law that have prompted those disagreements over the past decade.
19. 263 Ga. 645, 437 S.E.2d 327 (1993).
20. Id. at 646, 437 S.E.2d at 329. Plaintiff first failed to recover for its labor and
materials from the general contractor and, when unsuccessful, then sought recovery
directly against the county. See J & A Pipeline Co. v. DeKalb County, 208 Ga. App. 123,
124, 430 S.E.2d 13, 15, rev'd, 263 Ga. 645, 437 S.E.2d 327 (1993).
21. J & A Pipeline Co., 208 Ga. App. at 123, 430 S.E.2d at 13.
22. J & A Pipeline Co., 263 Ga. at 645, 437 S.E.2d at 327.
23. Id. at 647, 437 S.E.2d at 330 (citing O.C.GA. § 13-10-1 (repealed 2001)).
24. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 36-82-102 (repealed 2000)). The statute provides that if the
bond and affidavit are not taken in the required manner and form, "the [county] for which
work is done under the contract shall be liable to all subcontractors and to all persons
furnishing labor, skill, tools, machinery, or materials to the contractor or subcontractor
thereunder for any loss resulting to them from such failure." O.C.G.A. § 36-82-102
(repealed 2000).
25. J & A Pipeline Co., 263 Ga. at 649, 437 S.E.2d at 331. "[Tlhere is no express
requirement that a county, presented with the general contractor's payment bond or the
surety's affidavit which, on its face, comports with the statutory requirements... make
any further inquiry or investigation so as to defeat the subcontractors' or materialmen's
direct action remedy." Id.
"It follows that the county has no greater duty to subcontractors and
26. Id.
materialmen under [O.C.G.A. section] 36-82-102 than a private owner of improved property
has to subcontractors and materialmen under the lien laws." Id., 437 S.E.2d at 332.

12
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to subcontractors if it took bonds and necessary affidavits appearing
valid upon their face.2" The court thus rejected the court of appeals
position that, in order to defeat direct claims by sub-contractors and
materialmen, the county must inquire into the surety's "solvency and
sufficiency. "2
Seven years later, the county prevailed on another prominent financial
front in Jackson v. Shadix.2 9 There, county voters approved a referendum proposing that a special purpose local option sales tax be imposed
for raising "not more than $34,000,000. . . and for a period of time not
to exceed five (5) years."30 When the tax yielded the stated amount of
money in a period of less than five years,3 ' taxpayers contended that
the levy automatically terminated.32 Although the trial court rejected
plaintiffs' contentions, the court of appeals viewed the authorizing
statute as ambiguous and construed it against the county.33 A narrow-

ly divided supreme court granted certiorari and reversed. 4 The court
focused upon a statutory provision of termination "[o]n the final day of
the maximum period of time specified for the imposition of the tax." 5

27. Id. at 649-50, 437 S.E.2d at 332.
If... the county takes a payment bond from the general contractor or an affidavit
from the surety which does, on its face, comport with the statutory requirements,
the subcontractors' and materialmen's direct action remedy will be defeated
notwithstanding the subsequent inefficacy of the bond or the subsequent discovery
of the falsity of the affidavit.
Id.
28. The court emphasized that a later statute, not applicable in this case, does provide
that "[any payment bond required by this Code section shall be approved as to form and
as to the solvency of the surety by the officer of the . . . county . . . who negotiates the
contract." Id. at 650, 437 S.E.2d at 332 (citing O.C.G.A. § 13-10-1(f) (repealed 2001)).
Whether that statute might authorize a direct action against the county in these
circumstances "must await the case wherein that issue is properly presented and raised."
Id. at 651, 437 S.E.2d at 332.
29. 272 Ga. 631, 533 S.E.2d 706 (2000).
30. Id. at 632, 533 S.E.2d at 707. The tax imposed was a "mixed purpose" tax; i.e., a
tax for street, road, and bridge purposes, and for funding specified capital improvements.
31. Id. Collection of the tax began in 1994 and more than $34,000,000 had been
collected by 1998. Id.
32. Id.
33. Shadix v. Carroll County, 239 Ga. App. 191, 521 S.E.2d 99 (1999), rev'd, Jackson
v. Shadix, 272 Ga. 631,533 S.E.2d 706 (2000). For the statute empowering counties to levy
special purpose sales taxes, see O.C.G.A. § 48-8-110 to -122 (2002 & Supp. 2004).
34. Jackson, 272 Ga. at 634, 533 S.E.2d at 708. "An analysis of the statute and the
referendum persuades us that the trial court was correct in holding that the [tax] was to
terminate after five years, not after collection of the amount mentioned in the referendum.
Thus, the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the judgment of the superior court.... ." Id.
35. Id. at 633, 533 S.E.2d at 707. This provision was found in the controlling 1987
version of the statute, O.C.G.A. section 48-8-112 (Supp. 1994).
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The "unmistakable and unambiguous meaning" of that provision, the
court asserted, was measurement "by the period of time specified in the
resolution."3 6 Moreover, a later amendment to the statute, not applicable to this case, specified that such taxes would terminate "when the
amount provided for has been collected."37 That change, the court
insisted, confirmed the general assembly's belief that the earlier statute
had employed a "time-based termination." 8
The local option sales tax was continuing to shed issues of divisiveness
at the conclusion of the surveyed decade. The parties in City of Decatur
v. DeKalb County39 litigated the validity of an intergovernmental
contract under which the county agreed to disburse annually to
municipalities a portion of the proceeds collected under the Homestead
Option Sales and Use Tax Act.40 Although the statute required the
expenditure of not more than 20% of tax receipts for capital outlay
projects,4 ' a purpose the agreement was intended to facilitate, both the
42
trial court and the court of appeals rendered decisions of invalidity.
The problem emerged from the perceived contrast between contract and
statute. The former conferred tax expenditure power upon the cities; the
latter confined tax expenditures to the county.'
"[Tihe Intergovernmental Agreement," the court of appeals asserted, "seeks to shift that
responsibility to the municipalities."' As authority for its perspicuity,
the court quoted the supreme court's famous admonition in City of
Augusta v. Mangelly: "[I]t can never be a valid county purpose to
provide [its tax] revenue to a municipality."4 5

36. Jackson, 272 Ga. at 633, 533 S.E.2d at 707.
37. Id. at 634, 533 S.E.2d at 708. The later 1997 provision appeared in O.C.G.A.
section 48-8-112(b)(3). Id.
38. Id. A dissenting opinion for three justices maintained that the referendum was
confusing, that the voters could not know when the tax terminated, and that the provision
must be construed most strongly in favor of the taxpayers. Id. at 636-37, 533 S.E.2d at
709-10 (Sears, J., dissenting).
39. 277 Ga. 292, 589 S.E.2d 561 (2003).
40. See O.C.G.A. § 48-8-100 to -109 (2002). "HOST allows for a special sales tax to be
levied in a special tax district if the voters of that district so approve." City of Decatur, 277
Ga. at 293, 589 S.E.2d at 562.
41. City of Decatur, 277 Ga. at 293, 589 S.E.2d at 562; O.C.G.A. § 48-8-104(c)(2)(A)
(2002).
42. City of Decatur v. DeKalb County, 255 Ga. App. 868, 871, 567 S.E.2d 332, 334
(2002), rev'd, 277 Ga. 292, 589 S.E.2d 561 (2003).
43. Id. at 870, 567 S.E.2d at 334. "Contrary to the structure set forth in the statute,
the county has little power under the agreement to control what is done with the tax
proceeds once they are given to the municipalities." Id.

44. Id.
45. Id. (quoting City of Augusta v. Mangelly, 243 Ga. 358, 362, 254 S.E.2d 315, 319
(1979), superseded by statute, as stated in Nielubowicz v. Chatham County, 252 Ga. 330,
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Granting certiorari, the supreme court unanimously charged the court
of appeals with a "misplaced reliance" upon Mangelly.46 Immediately
following that decision, the court explained, the legislature enacted a
newer version of the Local Option Sales Tax Act.4" This later statute
rested upon the constitution's grant of a "special district" tax power,""
and authorizes "district taxes" which are immune to Mangelly's "county
tax" prohibition. 49 The disbursement of district taxes via an intergovernmental contract, an arrangement likewise enjoying express constitutional authorization, 0 encounters none of Mangelly's restrictive
proscriptions. The court accordingly reversed the court of appeals
condemnation of the county-city disbursement agreement.5 '
B.

County Liability

The moving target of local government liability consumes an inordinate share of the Georgia judiciary's time and efforts. It can come as
little surprise, therefore, that the subject also claims a considerable
legacy of appellate conflict. A healthy leaven of that conflict focuses
upon the liability of counties and their officers.52
The famous constitutional amendment of 1991 sought to bring some
stability to the issue by declaring sovereign immunity for the state and
"all of its departments and agencies," an immunity that may be

312 S.E.2d 102 (1984)).
46. City of Decatur, 277 Ga. at 293, 589 S.E.2d at 562. Two justices having been
disqualified, the court included two replacement judges. Id. at 294, 589 S.E.2d at 563.
47. Id. at 293, 589 S.E.2d at 562; O.C.G.A. § 48-8-80 (2002).
48. City of Decatur, 277 Ga. at 293, 589 S.E.2d at 562 (citing GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2,
para. 6).
49. Id. at 293-94, 589 S.E.2d at 562. The court relied upon its prior decision in Board
of Commissioners of Taylor County v. Cooper, 245 Ga. 251, 264 S.E.2d 193 (1980), to hold
"that a district tax created under that constitutional provision is not a 'county tax' within
the meaning of Mangelly, and that distribution of the proceeds from such a district tax to
municipalities does not violate the principles of Mangelly." Id.
50. See GA. CONST. art. IX, § 3, para. 1.
51. City of Decatur, 277 Ga. at 294, 589 S.E.2d at 562. "It does not violate Mangelly's
proscription on county taxes, and the Court of Appeals erred in so holding." Id. For a more
thorough treatment of the peculiarities of the Georgia county's taxing power, see R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Local Government Litigation:Some Pivotal Principles,55 MERCER L. REV. 1
(2003); R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., ADDITIONAL STUDIES IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
565-606 (1983); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., The County Spending Power:An AbbreviatedAudit
of the Account, 16 GA. L. REV. 599 (1982).
52. For a more thorough treatment of county liability, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Local
Government LiabilityLitigation:Numerical Nuances, 38 GA. L. REV. 633 (2004); R. Perry
Sentell, Jr., Local Government Tort Liability: The Summer of'92, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 405
(1993); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local Government Tort Liability: The "Crisis"
Conundrum, 2 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 19 (1985).
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explicitly waived by the general assembly.53 As for governmental
officers and employees, the amendment "provides no immunity for
ministerial acts negligently performed or for ministerial or discretionary
acts performed with malice or an intent to injure."54 In the 1994 case
of Gilbert v. Richardson,5 the appellate courts diverged on an implication of immunity waiver.5 The case featured an action against a
county sheriff and deputy for injuries plaintiff suffered in a collision with
the deputy.57 Both courts concluded that the county might waive its
sovereign immunity to the extent of any insurance purchased under
express authority of the motor vehicle insurance statute.5" However,
the supreme court rejected the court of appeals position that county
participation in a group insurance program did not constitute the
purchase of liability insurance.5 9 Rather, the court held this waiver of
county immunity operated to also waive the sheriff's sovereign immunity
the
for the negligence of his deputy." Consequently, the court reversed
61
court of appeals grant of summary judgment for the sheriff.
Insurance, albeit a "comprehensive liability policy,"6 2 likewise
attracted appellate dissension in the later case of Roberts v. Burke
County School District.' There, plaintiffs sued for the death of their
five-year-old child who was struck by a car some four-tenths of a mile

53. See GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9.
54. Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 753, 452 S.E.2d 476, 483 (1994).
55. 264 Ga. 744, 452 S.E.2d 476 (1994).
56. Id. at 744, 452 S.E.2d at 476.
57. Id. at 745, 452 S.E.2d at 478. At the time of the collision, the deputy was
responding to an emergency call. Id.
58. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 33-24-51 (1996). For treatment, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Tort
Liability Insurance in Georgia Local Government Law, 24 MERCER L. REV. 651 (1973).
59. Gilbert, 264 Ga. at 751,452 S.E.2d at 482. The court rejected the argument contra
as providing "no basis for a finding that [the] County's participation in GIRMA is not a
waiver of sovereign immunity." Id.
60. Id. at 754, 452 S.E.2d at 484.
[T]he official immunity of a public employee does not protect a governmental
entity from liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior ....Since deputy
sheriffs are employed by the sheriff rather than the county, sheriffs may be liable
in their official capacity for a deputy's negligence in performing an official function
.... Since, however, the county has waived sovereign immunity to the extent of
its liability insurance coverage, [the sheriffs] sovereign immunity defense is
likewise waived to that extent.
Id.
61. Id.
62. Roberts v. Burke County Sch. Dist., 267 Ga. 665, 666, 482 S.E.2d 283, 284 (1997).
63. 267 Ga. 665, 482 S.E.2d 283 (1997).
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from the place of his discharge by the school bus.6 Reversing the trial
court's conclusion of immunity waiver,65 the court of appeals employed
the insurance policy's coverage exclusion for injury arising from the "use"
of a vehicle. 6 Discharging the child at an unauthorized location and
requiring him to walk home, the court reasoned, were necessarily
concomitant to the "use" of the bus.6 ' The supreme court granted
certiorari and criticized the court of appeals fixation on the place where
the boy was killed.66 Contrarily, the court delineated, the trial judge
found the school district's negligence to consist of its "selection and
implementation of the unsafe route."6 9 That conduct, the supreme
court asserted, "is removed from the actual operation of the school
bus"7 ° and fell outside the policy exclusion.71
Aside from immunity, a local government may seek protection from
negligence liability by denying the existence of a "duty" owing to the
plaintiff in the circumstances.72 The Georgia Supreme Court adopted
the "public duty doctrine" in its 1993 decision in City of Rome v.
Jordan," formulating the following precept: "[Wihere failure to provide
police protection is alleged, there can be no liability based on a [local

64. "There was evidence that by the time of the fatal injury, the boy had walked about
four-tenths of a mile in the direction of his home and the school bus had traveled
approximately two miles away from the site where the child had been discharged." Id.
65. Burke County Sch. Dist. v. Roberts, 220 Ga. App. 510, 513, 469 S.E.2d 529, 532
(1996), rev'd, 267 Ga. 665, 482 S.E.2d 283 (1997).
66. Roberts, 267 Ga. at 666, 482 S.E.2d at 284. The material policy "contained an
exclusion of coverage for injury or damages arising from the ownership, maintenance,
operation, use, or loading or unloading of a vehicle." Id.
67. 'The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the
case with direction that the trial court enter an involuntary dismissal." Id.
68. Id. at 668, 482 S.E.2d at 286.
The illogic of such an approach is stark in a case such as this which involves a
young child, for it can well be argued that with a child of tender years there would
not be a point of safety, following discharge from a school bus, until the child was
inside his home and in the presence of a caregiver.
Id.
69. Id., 482 S.E.2d at 285.
70. Id.
71. Id., 482 S.E.2d at 286. "[T]he trial court correctly concluded that the boy's injury
and death could not be said to have arisen from the 'use' of the school bus within the
contemplation of the ... insurance policy. Therefore, the Court of Appeals determination
to the contrary does not stand." Id. One justice dissented, arguing that "[b]ecause the
death arose out of the use of the bus, the injury is excluded from coverage under the ...
policy." Id. at 669, 482 S.E.2d at 286 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
72. City of Rome v. Jordan, 263 Ga. 26, 426 S.E.2d 861 (1993).
73. 263 Ga. 26, 426 S.E.2d 861 (1993).
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government's] duty to protect the general public."7 4 Over the next
several years, both appellate courts experienced conceptual difficulties
in applying the "doctrine," difficulties culminating in Coffey v. Brooks
County.7 5 The case featured an action by motorists, who wrecked their
vehicles on a county road washed out by an unusually heavy rainstorm.
Plaintiffs alleged county negligence in failing to properly inspect and
barricade the road." The court of appeals, although viewing plaintiffs'
charges as "based on [defendant's] omissions, rather than any affirmative act of negligence,"77 concluded as follows: "[W]e are compelled not
to extend the public duty doctrine to ... law enforcement officers
engaged in the protection of the public at large from hazardous
conditions caused by the weather rather than by a third party."v"
Accordingly,
plaintiffs successfully hurdled the barrier of "public
79
duty. "
Taking the case on certiorari-under the style of Rowe v. Coffey-- - 0
the supreme court, via a combination of two two-justice opinions,
reversed."' The court's conclusion,8 2 emerging from a veritable blizzard of proffered views,83 rejected the court of appeals exclusion of
weather conditions from the reach of the public duty doctrine. Rather,
the doctrine applied to county officers failing to remedy the road
conditions;" those officers violated no duty to the motorists and thus
escaped negligence liability.8 5
As noted, the 1991 constitutional amendment confers "official
immunity" upon local government officers, sued in their individual

74. Id. at 28, 426 S.E.2d at 861. For a thorough treatment of Georgia's "public duty
doctrine," see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia'sPublic Duty Doctrine: The Supreme Court
Held Hostage, 51 MERCER L. REV. 73 (1999).
75. 231 Ga. App. 886, 500 S.E.2d 341 (1998), rev'd, Rowe v. Coffey, 270 Ga. 715, 515
S.E.2d 375 (1999).
76. Id. at 886, 500 S.E.2d at 344. Plaintiffs sued the county, its officers, and its
employees. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 888, 500 S.E.2d at 345 (emphasis in original).
79. Id. at 893, 500 S.E.2d at 349.
80. 270 Ga. 715, 515 S.E.2d 375 (1999).
81. Id. at 715, 515 S.E.2d at 375.
82. Id. The first opinion in the case, referred to as the "majority," reflected the views
of but two justices. It joined with another two-justice opinion, referred to as "specially
concurring," to constitute the supreme court's controlling position. Id.
83. Id. There were four different opinions in the case. Id.
84. See id. at 716, 500 S.E.2d at 377. Although the doctrine covered only protective
police services, those services included police protection in general. Id.
85. Id. For analysis of both the public duty doctrine and the supreme court's treatment
of Rowe v. Coffey, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia'sPublic Duty Doctrine: The Supreme
Court Held Hostage, 51 MERCER L. REV. 73 (1999).
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capacity, for "discretionary" functions performed negligently but without
malice or intent to injure."' The amendment exposes the officers'
"ministerial" functions to negligence liability.87 For officers sued in
their official capacity, however, the local government's sovereign
immunity affords complete protection. These delineations, as well, fall
subject to appellate disagreements."8
One such conflict arose in Seay v. Cleveland, 9 an action against a
county sheriff for alleged negligence in conducting sheriff's sales.9 ° The
court of appeals treated the sheriff's sale duties as amounting to
"ministerial" functions, thereby "forfeit[ing] the protections of sovereign
immunity."91 Taking the case on certiorari, a unanimous supreme
court emphasized that plaintiff had sued the sheriff in his "official
capacity."92 In that context the court explained, "[slovereign immunity
applies equally to ministerial and discretionary acts."" Accordingly,
plaintiff's claims "against [the sheriff] in his official capacity are
precluded under the doctrine of sovereign immunity," and both lower
courts had erred.94
When the employee is sued in his individual capacity for injury
resulting from a discretionary function, there is then the need to define
the "actual malice" sufficient to overcome his official immunity for
negligence.95 The appellate courts have found themselves in sharp
conflict over the proper definition. The dispute erupted in Adams v.
Hazelwood,' a student's action against a high school coach for injury
allegedly suffered in performing a work detail assignment.9 7 Although

86.

GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9.

87. Id.
88. For discussion of the liability of local government officials, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
Individual Liability in GeorgiaLocal Government Law: The Haunting Hiatus of Hennessy,
40 MERCER L. REV. 27 (1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local Government Officers:
Rights for Their Wrongs, 13 GA. L. REv. 747 (1979).
89. 270 Ga. 64, 508 S.E.2d 159 (1998).
90. Id. at 64, 508 S.E.2d at 160. Purchasers at a sheriffs sale complained of the
sheriffs failure to use sale proceeds to satisfy superior liens on the property purchased.

Id.
91. Seay v. Cleveland, 228 Ga. App. 836, 839, 493 S.E.2d 30, 32 (1997), rev'd, 270 Ga.
64, 508 S.E.2d 159 (1998).
92. Seay, 270 Ga. at 65, 508 S.E.2d at 161. The sheriff would have been liable for
negligently performing a ministerial function, the court noted, "had he been sued in his
personal capacity." Id.
93. Id., 508 S.E.2d at 160.
94. Id.
95. See Adams v. Hazelwood, 271 Ga. 414, 520 S.E.2d 896 (1999).
96. 271 Ga. 414, 520 S.E.2d 896 (1999).
97. Id. at 414, 520 S.E.2d at 897. The coach had assigned the student to the work
detail of cutting weeds with a pair of scissors for the student's admitted destruction of
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the trial court dismissed the suit, the court of appeals concluded there
was evidence of the coach's "ill will" in devising a demeaning assignment.9" The supreme court then granted certiorari to determine
"whether the Court of Appeals properly equated ill will with actual
malice in the context of official immunity."99 Answering in the negative, the court denigrated the equation as an "absurdity" and "contrary
to well-established rules."'0 0 In the context of "official immunity," the
court reasoned "actual malice means a deliberate intention to do a
wrongful act."10' A wrongful act "may be accomplished with or without
ill will and whether or not injury was intended."'0 2 There simply was
no evidence, the court concluded, that the coach "acted with a deliberate
intent to commit a wrongful act or with a deliberate intent to harm."0 3
Accordingly, the trial judge had correctly cloaked the coach's actions with
official immunity."°
C. Municipal Liability
Municipal liability, the decade's most prolific source of appellate
disagreement, encompasses a host of confounding issues. Although the
municipality enjoys a degree of sovereign immunity, it may also escape
tort responsibility on other grounds both statutory and common law.
Contrarily, liability may be imposed under theories not sounding in tort.
All these facets placed the court of appeals in line for supreme court
reversals. 105
Ironically, one traditional statutory exception to municipal immunity,
street and sidewalk defects, suffered a later statutory modification from

school property. The student sued alleging injury to his wrist. Id.
98. Hazelwood v. Adams, 235 Ga. App. 607,610, 510 S.E.2d 147, 151 (1998), rev'd, 271
Ga. 414, 520 S.E.2d 896 (1999).
99. Adams, 271 Ga. at 414, 520 S.E.2d at 897.
100. Id. at 415, 520 S.E.2d at 898. This standard would permit the employee's official
immunity to be pierced "solely on the basis of the defendant's rancorous personal feelings
toward the plaintiff, even though the defendant's actions in regard to the disliked plaintiff
may have been completely lawful and legally justified." Id.
101. Id. (citing Merrow v. Hawkins, 266 Ga. 390, 391, 467 S.E.2d 336, 337 (1996)).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 416, 520 S.E.2d at 899.
104. Id. The court thus reversed the court of appeals denial of summary judgment for
defendant. Id.
105. For a more thorough treatment of municipal liability, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr.,
Local Government Liability Litigation:Numerical Nuances, 38 GA. L. REV. 633 (2004); R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., Local Government Tort Liability: The Summer of '92, 9 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 405 (1993); R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAw OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN
GEORGIA (1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local Government Liability: The "Crisis"
Conundrum, 2 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 19 (1985).
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Illustratively, City of 7 bee Island v. Godinanother direction.'
ho'07 featured an action for injuries sustained on a defective city
sidewalk adjacent to a public beach. Plaintiff relied upon the historic
statute imposing municipal liability for negligently maintained streets
and sidewalks, 0 8 and the city countered with the more modem statute
owners who permit use of their property for
conferring immunity upon
"recreational purposes."0 9 In the court of appeals,"0 plaintiff carried
the day, on grounds that the state-owned beach, not the city sidewalk,
constituted the recreational property."' On certiorari the supreme
court read the "plain language" of the Recreational Property Act to
extend immunity to owners providing access to recreational property."' Holding the city sidewalk to qualify for13 "recreational" tort
immunity, the court reversed the court of appeals.
Entirely aside from governmental immunity, basic elements of tort law
often arise to control municipal liability litigation. One such element,
plaintiff's contributory negligence, surfaced as the pivotal point in City
of Winder v. Girone."4 There, plaintiff fell while directing cleanup
operations necessitated by raw sewage spills onto her property."' The
trial court granted summary judgment to the city, only to be reversed by
the court of appeals."' That court discounted the significance of
plaintiff's conduct in the case, emphasizing the city's trespass, which

106. See City of Tybee Island v. Godinho, 270 Ga. 567,511 S.E.2d 517 (1999), overruled
on other grounds by Atlanta Comm. for the Olympic Games, Inc. v. Hawthorne, 278 Ga.
116, 118, 598 S.E.2d 471, 474 (2004).
107. 270 Ga. 567, 511 S.E.2d 517 (1999).
108. Id. at 569, 511 S.E.2d at 519; see O.C.G.A. § 32-4-93 (2001).
109. Godinho, 270 Ga. at 567, 511 S.E.2d at 518; see O.C.G.A. § 51-3-20 to -26 (2000).
110. Godinho v. City of Tybee Island, 231 Ga. App. 377, 499 S.E.2d 389 (1998), rev'd,
270 Ga. 567, 511 S.E.2d 517 (1999).
111. Id. at 378, 499 S.E.2d at 391. The court of appeals thus reversed the trial court
in granting the city's motion for summary judgment. Id. at 380, 499 S.E.2d at 392.
112. Godinho, 270 Ga. at 568, 511 S.E.2d at 518. "Moreover, to exclude coverage in
these circumstances might encourage people not to provide access to their property for the
purpose of permitting people to enjoy property owned by others, and thus would defeat the
very purpose of the [Recreational Property Act]." Id., 511 S.E.2d at 518-19. Regarding the
traditional statute imposing sidewalk liability on municipalities, "the RPA will control
when the sidewalk is used for a 'recreational purpose' and the other requirements of the
RPA are satisfied, and § 32-4-93 will apply in other cases." Id. at 569, 511 S.E.2d at 519.
113. Id. at 569, 511 S.E.2d at 519. The court thus upheld the trial court's summary
judgment for the municipality. Id.
114. 265 Ga. 723, 462 S.E.2d 704 (1995).
115. Id. at 723, 462 S.E.2d at 704-05. Plaintiff alleged municipal negligence in failing
to maintain the offending sewer line. Id., 462 S.E.2d at 705.
116. Girone v. City of Winder, 215 Ga. App. 822, 825,452 S.E.2d 794, 797 (1994), rev'd,
265 Ga. 723, 462 S.E.2d 704 (1995).
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resulted in the dangerous condition." 7 Rejecting that position, 118 the
supreme court reasoned that under "traditional negligence principles,"" 9 there was undisputed evidence that plaintiff "attempted to
cross the sewage-covered patio with knowledge of [its] slippery nature."2 ° Accordingly, "'she is therefore barred from recovery by reason
of her failure to exercise ordinary care for her own safety.'"' 2 '
Another essential element of negligence, "proximate cause," has
dominated the instances of plaintiffs injured as a result of high-speed
police chases. 122 In this context as well, the supreme court has crafted
"law" via the process of reversals. A pivotal 1994 controversy, Mixon v.
City of Warner Robins,12 presented an action against the municipality
for the death of a motorist struck by a suspect fleeing from a police
officer. 1 24 Rejecting the claim, the court of appeals designated the
suspect's conduct to be the sole "proximate cause" of the collision.'25
In its reversing opinion, the supreme court acknowledged the "policy"
nature of the requisite solution 2 and focused upon a statute requiring
the pursuing officer "'to drive with due regard for the safety of all
persons.'' 127 The court then translated that mandate into the standard that the officer "balance the risk to the public with [his] duty to
enforce the law.'' 12' Given the circumstances,'129 a jury could find

117. Girone, 215 Ga. App. at 824, 452 S.E.2d at 796. "The Court of Appeals ... [made]
a distinction between dangerous conditions created by means of a trespass upon the
property of the person subsequently injured, and dangerous conditions created on the
property of the defendant that result in injury to a person who comes upon defendant's
property." Girone, 265 Ga. at 723, 462 S.E.2d at 705.
118. Girone, 265 Ga. at 723, 462 S.E.2d at 705. "That distinction is without precedent
....

"Id.

119. Id.
120. Id. at 724, 462 S.E.2d at 706.
121. Id. at 725, 462 S.E.2d at 706 (quoting Soto v. Roswell Townhomes, 183 Ga. App.
286, 288, 358 S.E.2d 670, 672 (1987)). The court thus reversed the court of appeals. Id.
122. See Mixon v. City of Warner Robins, 264 Ga. 385, 444 S.E.2d 761 (1994),
superseded by statute, as stated in City of Winder v. McDougald, 276 Ga. 866, 867, 583
S.E.2d 879, 880 (2003).
123. 264 Ga. 385, 444 S.E.2d 761 (1994).
124. Id. at 385, 444 S.E.2d at 762-63. Plaintiff sued for the death of his wife killed at
an intersection in a residential area when struck by a driver being pursued by a police
officer for running a stop sign. Id.
125. Mixon v. City of Warner Robins, 209 Ga. App. 414,434 S.E.2d 71 (1993), rev'd, 264
Ga. 385, 444 S.E.2d 761 (1994).
126. Mixon, 264 Ga. at 386, 444 S.E.2d at 763.
127. Id. at 388, 444 S.E.2d at 764 (quoting then O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6 (1994)).
128. Id. at 389, 444 S.E.2d at 765. The court extracted this standard from Travis v.
City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 98 (Tex. 1992).
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the officer's failure to act "with due regard" for the safety of other drivthe court could not declare the absence of "proximate
ers;' thus,
131
cause."
Immediately following the supreme court's decision in Mixon, the
legislature amended the governing statute to provide that the officer's
pursuit "shall not be the proximate cause or a contributing proximate
cause of the damage, injury or death caused by the fleeing suspect
unless the .. . officer acted with reckless disregard for proper law

enforcement procedures." 132 This statute then figured prominently in
the 2003 controversy, City of Winder v. McDougald,133 an action not on
behalf of a third party, but for the death of the fleeing suspect himself."
The court of appeals denied the city's motion for summary
judgment, 1" 5 and a closely divided supreme court reversed. 136 By
"imposing a reckless disregard standard in place of the negligence
standard,"'3 7 the supreme court reasoned the legislature narrowed
recovery for innocent persons. 38 It would be "absurd," the court
asserted, to find that it "simultaneously [expanded] liability to cover
injuries to the fleeing suspect." 39 The statute, therefore, "does not
govern the claim of the fleeing suspect."' 40
129. Mixon, 264 Ga. at 391, 444 S.E.2d at 766, i.e., the minor nature of the traffic
offense, the fact that the violator was not speeding until the officer began pursuit, and the
residential area. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. "It follows that the lack of 'proximate cause' in the instant case is not 'plain
and undisputed' and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the grant of summary
judgment in favor of [the officer] and the City on that basis." Id.
132. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6(d)(2) (2004).
133. 276 Ga. 866, 583 S.E.2d 879 (2003).
134. Id. at 866, 583 S.E.2d at 880. Plaintiffs' fourteen-year-old daughter was driving
her father's car without permission at 4:40 a.m. without lights when the police officer
attempted to stop her. With the police officer following her, the daughter lost control of the
car and crashed into a utility pole. Id.
135. City of Winder v. McDougald, 254 Ga. App. 537, 544, 562 S.E.2d 826, 831 (2002),
rev'd, 276 Ga. 866, 583 S.E.2d 879 (2003).
136. McDougald, 276 Ga. at 868, 583 S.E.2d at 881.
137. Id. at 867, 583 S.E.2d at 880.
138. Id. Accordingly, "ftihe fleeing suspect may be able to recover for her own injuries
if an officer acts with an actual intent to cause injury." Id. at 868, 583 S.E.2d at 881.
139. Id. at 867, 583 S.E.2d at 880.
140. Id. at 868, 583 S.E.2d at 881. A dissenting opinion for three justices emphasized
another provision of the statute requiring emergency vehicle drivers to drive with due
regard for the safety of all persons. (O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6(d)(1) (2004)). "The majority opinion's
distinction between innocent third parties and fleeing suspects in the coverage of [O.C.G.A.
section] 40-6-6(d) is based on an unstated and judicially-created public policy that fleeing
suspects are not entitled to any protection from police misconduct short of actual malice."
Id. at 870, 583 S.E.2d at 882 (Benham, J., dissenting).
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The supreme court's reversal in Mixon augured against the municipality,1 4 ' while McDougald's reversal operated in the municipality's

Both decisions rested upon legislation purporting to evolve
favor.'
tort law's "proximate cause" impact upon emergency vehicle chases.143
Appellate divisiveness in this specific context appropriately reflects the
amorphous heritage of the concept in the common law.
One traditional effort at evading the bar of municipal tort immunity
assumes the configuration of an action in nuisance."44 In Hibbs v. City
of Riverdale, 45 for example, plaintiffs employed the tactic to complain
of flooding conditions resulting from the city's approval of a defective
drainage system. 4" There, the supreme court reversed the court of
appeals 47 position that a claim founded in negligence could not
support an action for nuisance. 14" Rather, the supreme court delineated, the crucial distinction turned on whether the municipal conduct "was
a single isolated act of negligence."' 4 When municipal negligence
"causes the repeated flooding of property, a continuing, abatable
nuisance is established, for which the municipality is liable." 50 The
supreme court concluded the court of appeals had erred in failing to
determine the nature of the city's conduct.' 5'
Nuisance again polarized the courts in City of Douglasville v.
Queen,'52 an action for the deaths of two small girls struck by a train

141. Mixon, 264 Ga. at 385, 444 S.E.2d at 761.
142. McDougald, 276 Ga. at 866, 583 S.E.2d at 880.
143. See id.; Mixon, 264 Ga. at 385, 444 S.E.2d at 761.
144. For a more thorough treatment of nuisance liability in Georgia local government
law, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY IN GEORGIA 11734 (1988); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia County Liability: Nuisance or Not?, 43 MERCER L.
REv. 1 (1991); R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Municipal Liability in Georgia: The "Nuisance"
Nuisance, 12 GA. ST. B.J. 11 (1975).
145. 267 Ga. 337, 478 S.E.2d 121 (1996).
146. Id. at 337, 478 S.E.2d at 121-22. Plaintiffs charged the municipality with
negligently approving the developer's plans and construction of the subdivision's
inadequate storm drainage system, resulting in the maintenance of a nuisance. Id.
147. Hibbs v. City of Riverdale, 219 Ga. App. 457,465 S.E.2d 486 (1995), rev'd, 267 Ga.
337, 478 S.E.2d 121 (1996).
148. Hibbs, 267 Ga. at 337, 478 S.E.2d at 122.
149. Id. at 338, 478 S.E.2d at 122. "While a municipality enjoys sovereign immunity
from liability for negligent acts done in the exercise of a governmental function, it may be
liable for damages it caused to a third party from the creation or maintenance of a
nuisance." Id. at 337, 478 S.E.2d at 122.
150. Id. at 338, 478 S.E.2d at 122.
151. Id. at 339, 478 S.E.2d at 122-23.
152. 270 Ga. 770, 514 S.E.2d 195 (1999).
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while attending the city's Fourth-of-July parade."s The court of
appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the
city,154 only to itself suffer reversal by the supreme court.15 Probing
for the "unlawfulness" necessary for nuisance,"16 the supreme court
noted none: "[it was not unlawful for the City to route the parade...
onto [city] streets that passed next to railroad property."'5 7 Likewise
as to the requisite damage to persons within the sphere of operation:
"[D]uring the 30 or more years prior to the injuries incured by [decedents], no other parade spectator had ever been injured by a train on the
railroad tracks."155
Finally, claimants may press municipal liability on constitutional
grounds not sounding in tort. That effort sundered the appellate courts
in City of Atlanta v. Watson,'59 a claim that, in administering its noise
abatement program, the municipality discriminated against owners of
multi-family residences near the city airport."6 The city's purchase of
only single-family residences in the noise-affected area, plaintiffs
charged, worked an illegitimate and arbitrary distinction denying their
rights to equal protection.' 6 ' Reversing the court of appeals, 6 2 the

153. Id. at 770, 514 S.E.2d at 197. The girls were walking on the railroad track from
their family's car to their parents who were positioned on railroad property adjacent to the
public highway in the downtown area awaiting the city's annual Fourth-of-July parade.
Id.
154. Queen v. City of Douglasville, 232 Ga. App. 68, 72, 500 S.E.2d 918, 922 (1998),
rev'd, 270 Ga. 770, 514 S.E.2d 195 (1999).
155. Queen, 270 Ga. at 774, 514 S.E.2d at 199.
156. Id. at 773, 514 S.E.2d at 199. "That which the law authorizes to be done, if done
as the law authorizes, cannot be a nuisance... Thus, where the act is lawful in itself, it
becomes a nuisance only when conducted in an illegal manner to the hurt, inconvenience
or damage of another.'" Id. (quoting Mayor & Council of Savannah v. Palmerio, 242 Ga.
419, 425, 249 S.E.2d 224, 229 (1978)).
157. Id. "Accordingly, we reject as a matter of law the position that the City's holding
of its parade in the vicinity of railroad property which contained no danger created or
maintained by the City constituted a nuisance." Id.
158. Id. at 774, 514 S.E.2d at 199. One justice dissented urging that the nuisance issue
should go to a jury. Id. at 776, 514 S.E.2d at 200 (Hines, J., dissenting).
159. 267 Ga. 185, 475 S.E.2d 896 (1996).
160. Id. at 185, 475 S.E.2d at 898. The city's contested efforts proceeded under a
federal program for airports receiving federal funding, seeking to reduce existing land uses
incompatible with airport noise. Id. at 186, 475 S.E.2d at 898.
161. See GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 2. "The Georgia equal protection clause ...
requires that the State treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." 267 Ga.
at 187, 475 S.E.2d at 899.
162. Watson v. City of Atlanta, 219 Ga. App. 704,466 S.E.2d 229(1995), rev'd, 267 Ga.
185, 475 S.E.2d 896 (1996). The court of appeals reversed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment to the municipality. Id. at 705, 466 S.E.2d at 231.
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supreme court applied a "rational basis" test's in determining that the
city's classifications of property owners bore "a rational relationship to
the legitimate governmental purpose of reducing land use incompatible
with airport noise in a sound and responsible fiscal manner, while
simultaneously avoiding the virtual elimination of [a neighboring
municipality's] residential basis and the resulting negative impact on its
business community and infrastructure." 164 Equal protection, the65court
concluded, afforded plaintiffs no grounds for municipal 1iability.'
D. Condemnation
City of Marietta v. Edwards" presented a charge of bad faith in the
municipality's condemnation of property, property it had sold to
complainants only three months earlier. 6 7 Alleging that the city
misled them during the sale and that they subsequently expended
substantial sums on property improvements, complainants prevailed
over summary judgment in the court of appeals." On certiorari the
supreme court viewed the evidence somewhat differently and reversed.169 First, the court characterized a statement by the city sales
facilitator to complainants as falling far short of a "guarantee" that the
city "would not exercise its legal right of condemnation." 7 ° It "does
not show bad faith in the subsequent condemnation."' 71 Second, the
fact of the improvements to the property meant only that "the City will
have to pay just and adequate compensation.., valued as part of the
163. Watson, 267 Ga. at 187, 475 S.E.2d at 899. The court reasoned that there was
neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right in the case which would demand a higher
standard of judicial scrutiny. Id.
164. Id. at 190, 475 S.E.2d at 901. Evidence revealed that the city's purchase funds
had been limited and that multi-family residences could better withstand exclusion from
the program without "suffering a corresponding loss of tenant occupancy." Id. at 189, 475
S.E.2d at 900.
165. Id. at 190, 475 S.E.2d at 901. "[The classification drawn by the City between the
two types of residences does not violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection,
and we reverse the contrary ruling by the Court of Appeals." Id.
166. 271 Ga. 349, 519 S.E.2d 217 (1999). For perspective on condemnation, see R.
Perry Sentell, Jr., Condemning Local Government Condemnation, 39 MERCER L. REV. 11
(1987).
167. Edwards, 271 Ga. at 349, 519 S.E.2d at 217. Plaintiffs closed the purchase in
November and the municipality voted to condemn the property in February. Id.
168. Fowler v. City of Marietta, 233 Ga. App. 622, 504 S.E.2d 726 (1998), rev'd in part,
271 Ga. 349, 519 S.E.2d 217 (1999).
169. Edwards, 271 Ga. at 351-52, 519 S.E.2d at 219.
170. Id. at 350, 519 S.E.2d at 218. "Appellees have proved, at most, that the City's
condemnation plans were uncertain, changing, and inaccurately communicated during the
course of an entirely separate and distinct sales transaction." Id.
171. Id. at 351, 519 S.E.2d at 218.
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newly-renovated property on the date of taking." 1 72 Again, those
173
renovations in no way increased the evidence of municipal bad faith.
Accordingly, the supreme court determined "no genuine issue of material
fact" over whether, subsequent to the complainants' purchase, the city
"lost the constitutional right to condemn the property."174
E.

Official Entitlements

Georgia statutory law affords peace officers a number of rights,
including the right to be prosecuted only upon indictment by grand
jury.1 7 ' The point at which the officer possesses or loses that right
reared its countenance as yet another issue of appellate divisiveness.
The question arose in Dudley v. State,' a prosecution by accusation
of a former municipal police chief for an alleged crime committed during
his tenure of office. 177 Because he was no longer a peace officer at the
time of the prosecution's commencement, the court of appeals denied the
chief's entitlement to grand jury indictment. 1 7 Unanimously reversing
that decision, the supreme court deemed the controlling statutes "plain
and unequivocal" in affording peace officers "enhanced protections,"
including officials "no longer in office by the time of prosecution."' 79
This meaning was congruent with the legislative purpose of protecting
officers "against possible frivolous indictments" for acts performed while

172. Id.
173. Id. "The fact that Appellees made renovations to the property does not affect
either the City's right to condemn the right-of-way or its obligation to pay just and
adequate compensation." Id.
174. Id., 519 S.E.2d at 219. "Here, Appellees seek to estop the City from the exercise
of its right of eminent domain by asserting [the agent's] unauthorized statements as
evidence of the City's bad faith. This is precisely what [O.C.G.A. section] 45-6-5 prohibits."
Id. at 350, 519 S.E.2d at 218. For treatment of estoppel, see R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., THE
DocTRiNE OF ESTOPPEL IN GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (1995).
175. O.C.G.A. § 17-7-52 (2004); O.C.G.A. § 45-11-4 (2002). For a more thorough
treatment of the subject, see R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Georgia Local Government Officials and
the Grand Jury, 26 GA. ST. B.J. 50 (1989).
176. 273 Ga. 466, 542 S.E.2d 99 (2001).
177. Id. at 466, 542 S.E.2d at 101. While police chief, defendant, had an altercation
with a member of the city council and, after leaving office, was charged by accusation (and
later convicted) with simple battery. Defendant challenged the conviction on grounds that
he was not charged by grand jury indictment. Id.
178. Dudley v. State, 242 Ga. App. 53, 56, 527 S.E.2d 912, 915 (2000), reu'd, 273 Ga.
466, 542 S.E.2d 99 (2001).
179. Dudley, 273 Ga. at 467, 542 S.E.2d at 101. "O.C.G.A. § 17-5-52(a) states that
'peace officers shall be afforded the rights provided in Code Section 45-11-4,.. . [aind such
protections extend by express statement... to public officials accused of misdeeds in office
'presently or formerly holding such office.'" Id.
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Finally, the court concluded, this determination "comports

with the general precept of criminal jurisprudence that the provisions of
the law existing at the time of commission of a crime control."'
F

Governmental Innovations

The ancient historical foundations of governmental entities yield only
grudgingly to modern innovations. In a few Georgia localities, traditional political structures have experienced consolidating or unifying efforts
that, in turn, give birth to unprecedented forms of government. Because
Georgia law in the main makes no express provision for them, these
"modern" local governments must undergo a period of adaptation. The
process necessarily takes place in the context of litigation, individual
instances in which courts determine the new entity's "place" in the
scheme of previously existing "law." Often, the answer proves illusive;
it may provoke appellate disparity.
In Athens-Clarke County v. Walton Electric Membership Corp.,182 the
parties litigated the authority of a municipal-county "unified government" to impose a street franchise fee upon an electrical utility in the
formerly unincorporated area of the county."s The unified government
possessed that power only if it constituted a "municipality," described by
the utility fee statute as "[a]ny geographically defined political subdivision of this state, other than a county . . . ."'
In its consideration of
the issue, the court of appeals focused upon the unified government's
charter declaration that the entity "'shall be deemed to be both a
municipal corporation and a county throughout the total territory of said
government.'"" 5 Under that stricture the court denied the unified
government the status of "municipality" and held it devoid of statutory
power to impose the contested franchise fee."8 6

180. Id. at 468, 542 S.E.2d at 102. "Thus, a peace officer should not lose such
protections for the officer's actions in the performance of duty merely because the officer
is no longer employed as such at the time of prosecution." Id.
181. Id. "Accordingly, the judgement of the Court of Appeals is reversed. . . ." Id. at
469, 542 S.E.2d at 102.
182. 265 Ga. 229, 454 S.E.2d 510 (1995).
183. Id. at 229, 454 S.E.2d at 511. Prior to unification, the municipality could not
impose fees in the county's unincorporated areas. Id.
184. Id. at 230, 454 S.E.2d at 512 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 46-3-3(5)(A) (2004)).
185. Athens-Clarke County v. Walton Elec. Membership Corp., 211 Ga. App. 232, 439
S.E.2d 504 (1993), rev'd, 265 Ga. 229,454 S.E.2d 510 (1995) (quoting Athens-Clarke County
Charter). The unification was sanctioned by GA. CONST. art. IX, § 3, para. 2(a), and the
unified government's charter was granted in 1990 Ga. Laws 3560.
186. Walton Elec. Membership Corp., 211 Ga. App. at 235,439 S.E.2d at 507. The court
concluded that the unified government was not a "municipality" under the Georgia Electric
Service Territorial Act, O.C.G.A. § 46-3-1 to -55 (2004).
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Reversing that decision, a unanimous supreme court emphasized the
unified government's charter authorizations "to perform multiple and
substantial municipal functions."8 7 Accordingly, the newly-created
entity existed as a municipal-county "hybrid," "something other than a
county," and well within the empowering statute's grant "to assess
franchise fees against the EMC."'" Moreover, the court concluded the
government's adoption of a reasonable fee ordinance, followed by the
utility's continued use of the streets, obligated payment of the fee despite
the absence of a formal "agreement."18 9
IV.

CONCLUSION

In performing its Marshallian "duty" of saying "what the law is,"
Georgia's "judicial department" functions at both trial and appellate
plateaus. The appellate system, moreover, operates through two
constitutionally designated "courts of review." Generally (at least for
present purposes), the Georgia Court of Appeals reviews the trial courts,
and the Georgia Supreme Court reviews the court of appeals. Because
the supreme court's decisions bind "all other courts," they necessarily
provide "correct" (final) disposition of the issues presented. When the
supreme court reverses the court of appeals, therefore, it "corrects" the
"errors" committed by the latter court in reviewing the trial process.
The full extent of this "correcting" phenomena holds profound significance for an appraisal of our bi-level appellate system. An encompassing
study of all facets of all appellate reversals-frequency of occurrence,
subjects impacted, consistency of results, causal consequences-would
add immeasurably to our jurisprudential understanding. Such a study
would also require incalculable amounts of time, patience, and perseverance.
This brief effort tenders a minuscule alternative. Isolating the subject
of local government law and confining the period of scrutiny to the last
decisional decade, the account reveals at least some information about
appellate reversals. The small study proceeds along two revealing lines
of analysis: the numerical and the substantive. Numerically, it is
revealed that the Georgia Supreme Court acts neither frequently nor
occasionally in reversing the court of appeals. Rather, the correction
process maintains a relatively steady judicial pace, with reversals

187. Walton Elec. Membership Corp., 265 Ga. at 230, 454 S.E.2d at 512. Therefore, so
long as it is "other than a county," it is a "municipality" under the Act. Id.
188. Id. at 230-31, 454 S.E.2d at 512. "[T]he county's continued existence does not
mean that the new hybrid form of government is a county." Id. at 230, 454 S.E.2d at 512.
189. Id. at 231-32, 454 S.E.2d at 513. "That being so, the holding of the Court of
Appeals that an agreement would be necessary is incorrect." Id. at 232, 454 S.E.2d at 513.
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assuming a fairly even distributional pattern throughout the scrutinized
decade. Additionally, the reviewed experience portrays a supreme court
that is generally unanimous in its decision to reverse. Moreover, in a
solid majority of the instances, the court's reversal operated to restore
the result originally reached by the trial court. In every one of those
instances, in turn, (i.e., cases in which the supreme court reversed the
court of appeals reversal of the trial court), the outcome favored the local
government. Finally, a resounding 72% of the supreme court's total
reversals operated to "correct" a court of appeals decision against the
local government.
Substantively, the study roughly groups into six classifications the
issues drawing the appellate courts' disagreements over the past decade.
Apparently, those issues project local government law's most confounding
problems of the era. Although it is no surprise to find local government
"liability-immunity" leading the list, the extent of the lead is impressive.
Undoubtedly, it results not only from the complexity of the subject
matter, but also from the inordinate machinations effected by both
legislative and judicial attention to the subject. They show no signs of
abating. Issues of county finance likewise attained a prolific status on
the supreme court's reversal agenda, with litigation over special option
Those
local sales taxes assuming an anticipated predominance.
instances confirm both the taxpayer animosity to taxation in general, as
well as the continuing sales tax confrontation between municipalities
and counties.
Specifics aside, the study strives to impress with two overall reflections: the potential of appellate reversal in the law-making context and
its special bearing on local government law.

